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DICTA
TOWARD A MORE LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
NICHOLAS H. MAGILL*
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
provides in part that "No person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself . .
The law of searches and seizures is the product of the inter-
play of these two constitutional provisions. Both amendments re-
late to the personal security of the citizen. The former protects
his privacy and preserves inviolate his right to be let alone; the
latter protects the individual against compulsory production of
evidence to be used against him. They almost imperceptibly blend
and mutually throw light upon each other.'
The purpose of this article is to inquire into the federal exclu-
sionary rule concerning evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. The rule is simple. Such evidence is inad-
missible. But the application of the rule to a given factual situa-
tion is fraught with difficulty and uncertainty in determining
whether, under the particular circumstances, the evidence was ob-
tained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
THE GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE
In 1886, the Supreme Court of the United States held that
the Fifth Amendment protected every person from incrimination
by the use of evidence obtained through a search and seizure made
in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment. 2 Not
until 1914, however, did the Court lay down the rule excluding evi-
dence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and permit
the victim of an unreasonable search to suppress the evidence so
obtained. 3
* Student at the University of Denver College of Law.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) ; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)
Davis v. United States, 828 U.S. 582 (1946).
2 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
a Weeks v. United States. 282 U.S. 883 (1914).
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Since then, the rule has been frequently invoked. In most
cases it has been rigidly adhered to whenever the circumstances
justified its application. Of course, where the evidence sought to
be suppressed was obtained under the sanction of a valid search
warrant, the rule has no application. But the presence or absence
of a valid search warrant is not the sole criterion to determine
the legality of a search or seizure. During the period from 1914-
1.946, which for convenience will be called the formative period,
special circumstances were found to justify the admission of evi-
dence, although obtained in a search conducted without a search
warrant. Some of these extenuating circumstances were recog-
nized in the pronouncements of the Court which gave birth to
the rule.
As an incident to a lawful arrest, the Court had upheld
searches of premises within the immediate control of the person
arrested.4 It was well settled that there could be a seizure of arti-
cles and papers found on the person arrested. Arresting officers
were also permitted to seize the fruits and evidence of crime which
were in plain sight and in their immediate and discernible pres-
ence. 5 General exploratory searches as an incident to a. lawful
arrest, however, had been emphatically denounced as unconstitu-
tional.6
It was early held that a federal prosecutor might make such
use as he pleased of documents or other information acquired from
a trespasser if persons other than federal officers had committed
the trespass.' If a federal officer had a hand in the illegal search,
the evidence must be excluded; but evidence secured by state officers
and turned over to a federal prosecutor was admissible in a federal
proscution.8 Passive co-operation, as well as active participation,
by federal officers in an illegal search must result in the exclusion
of the evidence. 9
Another variation of the rule is that evidence obtained in
violation of one person's constitutional rights does not render such
evidence inadmissible against another person.10 In order to com-
plain of an unlawful search and seizure, one must claim ownership
in or a right to possession of the premises searched or in the prop-
erty seized."
While the Court has held that offices, as well as homes, were
within the protection of the Fourth Amendment,1 2 a distinction
4 Angello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
5 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) ; Agnello v. United States, 209 U.S. 20 (1925).
6 Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 482 (1931) ; United States v. Leftkowitz,
285 U. S. 452 (1932).
1 Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
:Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
5 Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927).
10 Holt v. United States, 42 F. 2d 103 (C.C.A. 6th 1930) ; Kelley v. United States, 61 F. 2d
843 (C.C.A. 8th 1932) ; Lewis v. United States, 92 F. 2d 952 (C.C.A. 10th 1937) ; See Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20, 35 (1925) ; But Cf. McDonald v. United States, 69 S. Ct. 191 (1948).
"Cases cited note 10, supra; O'Kelley v. United States, 149 F. 2d 381 (App. D.C. 1945), cert.
denied 326 U.S. 724 (1945) ; Grainger v. United States, 158 F. 2d 236 (C.C.A. 4th 1946).
15 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
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has been made between a search and seizure in a house and a
search and seizure in the fields. 13 The Court has upheld the search
of a moving vehicle without a warrant where the officers had prob-
able cause to believe it was being used to violate the National Pro-
hibition Act. 14 On the basis of this pronouncement, lower federal
courts have held that officers may stop and search a vehicle with-
out a warrant where they have probable cause to believe it is being
used to commit a crime, if it would not be reasonably practicable
to secure a warrant. 15 The requirement that a warrant must be
obtained whenever reasonably practicable has been repeatedly em-
phasized by the courts. 16
Thus, in 1946, the rule enunciated in the Weeks case emerged
from its formative period clothed with the interpretive pronounce-
ments of the federal courts. For the most part the rule had been
liberally applied in favor of the citizen; the courts scrupulously
guarding his right to be let alone.
THE CONCEPT OF "REASONABLE SEARCH" EXPANDED
1. Davis v. United States
In 1946, beginning with the case of Davis v. United States,
17
continuing through Zap v. United States,' and culminating in mid-
1947 with Harris v. United States,9 the Supreme Court, in hold-
ing the federal exclusionary rule inapplicable, constructively ex-
panded the concept of "reasonable search", and extended the legi-
timate scope of a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
In the Davis case, investigators for the Office of Price Admin-
istration, without a warrant of any kind, arrested the defendant
after the investigators had procured an illegal purchase of gaso-
line from a service station, a corporation, operated and managed
by the defendant. The arrest was for the misdemeanors of selling
gasoline over ceiling price and without obtaining ration coupons
therefor. 20 The investigators, suspecting that the defendant had
an illegal supply of ration coupons, demanded access to the latter's
office, the repository of the coupons. At first the defendant refused
to unlock the door; whereupon, he was told that he would have
to unlock it. Noticing one of the investigators shining a flashlight
,:Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
14 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 182 (1925) ; Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931).
15 Morgan v. United States, 159 F. 2d 85 (C.C.A. 10th 1947) ; Cannon v. United States, 158
F. 2d 952 (C.C.A. 5th 1946), cert. denied 330 U.S. 839 (1947). rehearing denied. 431 U.S. 863
(1947) ; United States v. One 1941 Oldsmobile Sedan, 158 F. 2d 818 (C.C.A. 10th 1946). But cf.
Hart v. United States, 162 F. 2d 74-(C.C.A. 10th 1947).
16 Carroll v. United States( 267 U.S. 182 (1925) ; Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932)
Hart v. United States. 162 F. 2d 74 (C.C.A. 10th 1947).
1? 828 U.S. 582 (1946).
Is828 U. S. 624 (1946).
19 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
2054 Stat. 676, as amended, 55 Stat. 236, 56 Stat. 177, 50 U.S.C. App. 5633 (Supp. IV).
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beam through a rear window, and apparently attempting to raise
the window, the defendant submitted to the officers' demands. The
defendant obtained from his office an envelope containing ration
coupons, which he surrendered to the officers. The coupons were
found to be in excess of the lawful number which defendant was
permitted to have in his possession. He was subsequently indicted
and convicted, not for the misdemeanors for which he was initially
arrested, but for the illegal possession of the coupons, another
misdemeanor.
2 '
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Although the
Court felt that the seizure was reasonable as an incident to a law-
ful arrest, the decision rested mainly on another ground. Relying
on Wilson v. United States, 22 the Court held that the defendant,
being a custodian of the ration coupons which were government
property, was not protected against the production of the incrimi-
nating coupons. Emphasizing a distinction between public and
private papers, the Court said that the strict test of consent, de-
signed to protect an accused against production of incriminating
documents, has no application where public papers are sought.
Since the coupons were obtained from a place of business, at a
reasonable hour, in response to a demand of authority rightly
made, 23 the defendant's constitutional rights had not been violated.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by the late Mr. Justice Mur-
phy, dissenting, pointed out that Wilson v. United States, invoked
by the Court, was not in point. The Wilson case dealt, not with
an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, but with
the question of self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment,
in which it was held that the immunity against self-incrimination
did not extend to a corporation, even though the evidence tended
to incriminate an individual officer of the corporation. The Wilson
case dealt with the distinction between public and private papers
concerning testimonial compulsion, not search and seizure. Merely
because there may be a duty to make public documents available
for litigation in response to lawful process does not mean that
police officers may forcibly or coercively obtain them. The right
to be let alone, except under judicial compulsion, is precisely what
the Fourth Amendment meant to express and safeguard.
The authorization of search warrants, under the circumstances
of this case, was withheld by Congressional Act.24 Hence, the
search and seizure would not be legal had they been conducted
under a magistrate's warrant. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, on the
basis of this reasoning, thought that the Court's holding the search
21 Note 20, supra.
2221 U.S. 361 (1911).
2 The right to inspect books and make investigations is reserved to the government by virtue
of the Act cited. Note 20, supra.
4The Espionage Act limits the issuance of search warrants to those cases in which the prop-
erty sought was stolen or embezzled. used to commit a felony, or to illegally aid a foreign nation.
40 Stat. 217, 228,- 18 U.S.C.A. §612.
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in this case legal was tantamount to holding that a search which
could not be justified under a warrant was lawful without a war-
rant.
The paramount factor in the opinion of the Court was that
the officers, pursuant to Congressional authority, had the right to
demand inspection of defendant's coupons and conduct an exami-
nation relative thereto.25 It was in this connection that the distinc-
tion between public and private papers was made. In applying
the doctrine of the Wilson case, it would seem, at first blush, that
the Court did not clearly distinguish between self-incrimination
under the Fifth Amendment and unreasonable search and seizure
under the Fourth Amendment. Being an officer of a corporation,
the defendant could not have refused to produce the coupons in
response to a subpoena duces tecum. But it seems a tremendous
hurdle from this to the conclusion that the defendant could not
object to the seizure of the coupons without judicial process. Be
that as it may, does not the case illustrate the interplay of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments? 20
2. Zap v. United States
A case decided by the Court at approximately the same time
as the Davis case, also involving the right of federal agents to in-
spect books pursuant to Congressional authority, is Zap v. United
States.2 7 In this case, the defendant was convicted of presenting
false claims against the United States, a felony. 28 The defendant,
an aeronautical engineer, had a contract with the Navy Depart-
ment to perform experimental work on aircraft and to carry out
test flights to determine the success of his experiments. The test
flights were to be paid for on a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee basis. He esti-
mated the cost at four thousand dollars, but made arrangements,
however, for the tests at twenty-five hundred dollars. The defend-
ant induced the test pilot to indorse a blank check on the pretense
that the check was needed for his records. The defendant, through
his auditor and clerks, then caused the check to be filled in for
four thousand dollars and deposited in his account. The check was
entered in the books as payment to the test pilot, although in fact
the pilot had received only twenty-five hundred dollars. In pre-
senting his claims to the government, the /defendant represented
the cost of the tests at four thousand dollars. Pursuant to Con-
gressional authority and the contract, the United States had the
right to inspect and audit the books and records of contractors such
as the defendant. 29 During the course of an audit, federal officials
21 Note 23, supra.
2 Note 1, supra.
27 Note 18, supra.
2 Criminal Code, §35(A), 18 U.S.C.A. §80.
u44 Stat. 787, 10 U.S.C. §310(1) and 56 Stat. 185. 50 U.S.C. App. 5643 (Supp. IV).
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discovered the check. Under defective process, the federal officers
seized the check. On the basis of this evidence the defendant was
convicted.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the
check, having been obtained during the course of lawful exami-
nation of the defendant's books, was legally seized irrespective of
the defective warrant for its seizure.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by the late Mr. Justice Mur-
phy and Mr. Justice Rutledge, dissenting, pointed out that, al-
though the search be lawful, it does not necessarily follow that
the seizure is lawful. The dissent found support in previous rul-
ings of the Court that "the requirement that warrants shall par-
ticularly describe the things to be seized . . . prevents the seizure
of one thing under a warrant describing another." 30 If a search
with a warrant does not permit seizure of articles other than those
specified, statutory and contractual authority merely to search
cannot be considered sufficient to grant that power.
3. Harris v. United States
Both the Davis and Zap cases were 4-3 decisions. They were
decided soon after the passing of Mr. Chief Justice Stone and at
the time Mr. Justice Jackson was in Nuremberg. The three Jus-
tices dissenting in these cases also dissented in Harris v. United
States,3l where they were joined by Justice Jackson.
In the Harris case, federal agents, acting under the authority
of an arrest warrant charging violation of the Mail Fraud Statute 32
and the National Stolen Property Act,3 3 gained access to the de-
fendant's apartment. After placing the defendant under arrest,
the agents conducted a search of his four-room apartment. The
search was made for the purpose of finding cancelled checks be-
lieved to have been stolen by the defendant and used to perpetrate
a forgery. After a meticulous, five-hour search, the agents dis-
covered in a bedroom bureau drawer an envelope marked "George
Harris, Personal papers." Therein the agents found Selective
Service Classification Cards and Registration Certificates. Harris
was convicted, not for the crimes for which he was initially ar-
rested, but for the unlawful possession, concealment and alteration
of the classification cards and certificates, 34 his motion to suppress
the evidence having been overruled.
The Supreme Court sustained the admission of the evidence
on the ground that the search and seizure, although concededly
without the authority of a search warrant, were incidental to a
lawful arrest. Confronted with their earlier decisions in which
3Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192. 196 (1927).
" Note 19, supra.
"85 Stat. 1180. 1181, 18 U.S.C. 1388.
"58 Stat. 1178, 1179, 18 U.S.C. §418 et seq.
8454 Stat. 885, 894-895, 50 U.S.C. App. §311; and 85 Stat. 1098, 18 U.S.C. J101.
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general exploratory searches had been denounced,3 5 the Court found
it necessary to distinguish the Harris case. The Court based its
distinction on the ground that the agents in the Harris case had
conducted the search for the purpose of discovering the instru-
mentalities by which the crimes charged in the arrest warrant
had been committed, which the agents had reason to believe were
in the defendant's apartment. Hence, the Court reasoned, the
entry upon the premises being authorized and the search which
followed being valid, there is nothing in the Fourth Amendment
which prohibits the seizure of government property, the posses-
sion of which is a crime, discovered in the course of the search,
even though the officers were not aware that such property was
on the premises when the search was initiated. The draft cards,
being government property, were illegally in the custody of the
defendant, and in so retaining them, Harris was guilty of a "con-
tinuing offense" against the laws of the United States. A crime
was being committed in the very presence of the agents conduct-
ing the search.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in the Harris case, based
his dissent largely on the ground that even if the agents had a
warrant to search for cancelled checks, they could not seize other
items discovered in the process.38 Repeating his dissenting state-
ments from the Zap case, he again emphasized that even if the
search was reasonable it did not follow that the seizure was lawful.
He was of the opinion, however, that the search was illegal at its
inception and so could 'not retrospectively gain legality by what
was uncovered. The Justice further seized upon the fact that there
was ample opportunity for the officers to have secured authority
from a magistrate to conduct the search, and later authority to
have seized the unexpected articles discovered in the search.
While the Harris case has made definite inroads on the pro-
tection afforded by the Fourth Amendment, later cases, as will be
seen, have confined it strictly to its facts. In the later case of
Trupiano v. United States,37 after distinguishing its facts from
those in the Harris case, the Court stated that it was confining
itself to the precise facts of the case under consideration, "leaving
it to another day to test the Harris situation by the rule that search
warrants are to be obtained and used whenever reasonably prac-
ticable," 38 Whether the Court, if confronted with similar facts,
would overrule the Harris case is, of course, speculative. The words
of the Court in the Trupiano case, however, seem not without sig-
nificance. Whether the decision in the Harris case is sound or not,
it does mark the high-water point beyond which the Court has
5 Note 6, supra.
W Cf. Fed. Rules Crim. Procedure, 41(e) (1946). 18 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1948), following section
687, which provides that the evidence can be suppressed on the ground that "the property seized
is not that described in the warrant."
334 U.S. 699 (1948).
$ 84 U.S. at 709.
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since refused to go. More than that, the Harris case is a conspicu-
ous turning point in the trend of decisions in the field of search
and seizure.
A RETURN TO LIBERALITY
1. Johnson v. United States
Beginning with the case of Johnson v. United States,39 in
December, 1947, and continuing through Lustig v. United States,
40
in June, 1949, the Court appears to have returned to a policy of
applying the Fourth Amendment more liberally in favor of the
citizen. The Johnson case was the first to be decided in which those
Justices who had dissented in the Davis, Zap and Harris cases
began to constitute the majority of the Court, having been joined
by Mr. Justice Douglas. While the Johnson case deals mainly with
the illegality of an arrest made without a warrant, rather than
with the scope of a search and seizure as an incident to a lawful
arrest, it tends to illustrate the Court's return to a policy of
vigilantly guarding the citizens' right to be let alone.
In the Johnson case, federal narcotics agents, acting upon in-
formation that unknown persons were smoking opium in a certain
hotel, were there conducting an investigation. Recognizing the
odor of burning opium apparently emanating from the defendant's
room, the agents, without a warrant, demanded entry to the room
under color of office. They had not known the occupant of the
room, until after identifying themselves, they were admitted by
the defendant. Placing the defendant under arrest, the agents
then conducted a search of her room, which revealed incriminating
opium and smoking apparatus. The defendant was subsequently
convicted for violations of the federal narcotics laws.
41
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction. In holding that
it was unlawful to arrest the defendant and search her living
quarters without the sanction of a warrant, the Court stated that
no exceptional circumstances appeared to justify the search with-
out a warrant. The Fourth Amendment, the Court held, requires
that those inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence
must be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of
being judged by the officers engaged in the "often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime. ' 42 The Court also stated that
there was not probable cause to arrest the defendant until the
officers had entered her room and found her to be the sole occu-
pant. In such case, the Government was obliged to justify the
9 833 U.S. 10 (1947).
4o69 S. Ct. 1872 (1949).
41 26 U.S.C. 12553(a) ; and 21 U.S.C. §174.
0888 U.S. at 14.
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arrest by the search and at the same time justify the search by
the arrest. This, the Court said, will not do.
One of the most criticized parts of the Court's opinion in
Harris v. United States 43 was the implication that a search could
be justified by the nature of what was turned up during such
search. It would seem that any such implication was repudiated
in the Johnson case, the Court stating:
Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a
magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search
warrant will justify the officers in making a search with-
out a warrant would reduce the [Fourth] Amendment to
a nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the
discretion of police officers.
4 4
2. McDonald v. United States
A recent case somewhat similar in its facts to the Johnson
case, although involving the rule that in order to complain of an
unreasonable search and seizure one must have a property interest
in the premises searched or the articles seized, is McDonald v.
United States.
45
In the McDonald case, police officers in the District of Colum-
bia, believing that an illegal lottery was in process in a room
rented by the accused, gained access to the rooming house by enter-
ing a window leading into the landlady's room. They had neither
an arrest nor a search warrant. After illegally gaining entrance
to the building, one of the officers, looking through the transom of
accused's room, saw the tenant and another person in the room,
as well as numbers slips, money and adding machines. The officers
entered the room, placed the occupants under arrest and seized
the lottery paraphernalia. On the basis of this evidence, both the
tenant and his guest were convicted of carrying on an illegal
lottery.
46
The conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court in an
opinion written by Mr. Justice Douglas. The Court held, with
regard to the tenant, that the evidence should have been excluded
and the property returned to him, on the ground that the search
and seizure were made without a warrant and no compelling rea-
sons appeared to justify the non-procurement of a warrant. Assum-
ing, without deciding, that none of the guest's constitutional rights
had been violated, the Court, nevertheless, felt obliged to reverse
the guest's conviction, because the convictions of both the tenant
and the guest were based on the same physical evidence which the
Court held should have been returned to the tenant in response
8 Note 19, supra.
333 U.S. at 14.
"69 S. Ct. 191 (1948).
"22 D.C. Code, J§ 1501, 2. 5 (1940).
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to his motion for suppression and return. The admission of the
evidence against the guest was necessarily prejudiced to the rights
of the tenant.
3. Di Re v. United States
Because of the similarity in facts between the McDonald and
Johnson cases, the chronological arrangement of the cases herein
was interrupted for the purpose of facilitating comparison between
these two cases. In the interim, the case of United States v. Di Re,47
which further illustrates the Court's trend toward a more liberal
application of the Fourth Amendment, was decided.
In the Di Re case, an investigator for the Office of Price Ad-
ministration had received information that his informer had ar-
ranged to purchase ration coupons from one Buttitta. The investi-
gator and a local police officer trailed Buttitta's car to the appointed
place. There they found the informer sitting in the back seat of
the car holding two ration coupons, which he said he had obtained
from Buttitta. The coupons were counterfeit. The investigator
had not known that Di Re, who was sitting in the front seat with
Buttitta, was to be present at the rendezvous. Nor was he pointed
out by the informer as being a participant in the illegal trans-
action. Di Re, along with the others, was taken into custody and
"frisked". He was found to have two gasoline ration coupons in
his pockets. He was then booked and thoroughly searched, at
which time additional coupons were found in an envelope between
his shirt and underwear. Di Re was subsequently convicted of
knowingly possessing counterfeit gasoline ration coupons, a mis-
demeanor.
4
The Supreme Court, in reversing the conviction, rejected the
Government's contention that the search of Di Re was justifiable
either as an incident to a lawful arrest or as an incident to a
search of a vehicle believed to be carrying contraband.
Under the applicable law, an arrest without a warrant, to be
valid, must be for a misdemeanor committed in the arresting
officer's presence; or, if for a felony, the officer must have reason-
able cause to believe that the suspect had committed a felony.
The defendant was arrested for a misdemeanor. But no mis-
demeanor had been committed by Di Re in the officer's presence.
Admittedly, at the time of the arrest, the officer had no information
implicating Di Re and no information pointing to his possession of
the coupons. His mere presence in the car, the Court held, did not
permit the inference that he was then committing a misdemeanor.
Hence, the arrest itself was unlawful.
On appeal, the Government attempted to justify the arrest on
the ground that probable cause existed for believing that Di Re
7 832 U.S. 581 (1948).
" Section 301 of the Second War Powers Act, 1942, 50 U.S.C. App. §638 (Supp. V. 1946).
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had committed the felony of conspiracy under Section 37 of the
Criminal Code. 49 It was also asserted that probable cause existed
for believing the defendant guilty of possessing a known counter-
feit writing with the intent to utter it as true for the purpose of
defrauding the United States, a felony under Section 28 of the
Criminal Code.5 0
The Court, assuming arguendo, that an arrest without a war-
rant on a charge not committed at the time may later be justified
if the arresting officer's knowledge gave probable cause to believe
any felony in the statute books had been committed, held that the
circumstances at the time of this arrest afforded no reason to be-
lieve that Di Re had committed any felony. If the presence of Di Re
in the automobile did not authorize an inference of bare participa-
tion in the sale of the coupons, a fortiori, it could not support an
inference of felony where knowledge and intent are elements of the
offense.
In reply to the Government's second defense of the search,
that it was justified as an incident to the search of a vehicle reason-
ably believed to be carrying contraband, the Court held that, as-
suming reasonable ground to search the car existed, this did not
confer an additional right to search the occupants. The right to
search a car without a warrant confers no greater latitude to search
occupants than a search with a warrant would permit. Had the
Officer been armed with a warrant to search the car, he would have
no authority to search the persons found therein. The defendant's
mere presence in the car did not cause him to lose immunities from
search of his person to which he would otherwise be entitled. In this
respect, it will be remembered that the Fourth Amendment re-
quires a warrant "particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized."
4. Trupiano v. United States
The rule that a search warrant may be dispensed with under
certain circumstances where it is not reasonably practicable to
secure one is only applicable when there has been a lawful arrest.
The converse of this rule is also true. An interesting case on
this point is Trupiano v. United States,5 1 in which the Court held
that, notwithstanding the existence of a lawful arrest, the officers
could not seize contraband which was in plain sight where they
had ample opportunity and it was reasonably practicable for them
to have secured a warrant.
In the Trupiano case, federal agents had received information
that the defendant planned to build and operate a still. One of the





over a period of three months, aided him in erecting the still. This
agent was in possession of a two-way radio set, and consequently,
kept the head office informed of the progress being made. At the
opportune time, while the defendant was in the act of operating
the still, federal agents moved in and arrested him. After placing
him under arrest, certain contraband material was seized, although
the officers had not a search warrant.
The Supreme Court held that the arrest was valid since made
for a crime committed in the presence of the officers; but the search
and seizure were held invalid because of the abundance of time in
which the officers could have secured a search warrant. Recognizing
the well-established rule that arresting officers may look around
at the time of the arrest and seize those items of contraband which
are in plain sight, the Court held that it did not apply where it was
reasonably practicable for the officers to secure a warrant. Quoting
from Johnson v. United States,52 the Court said:
No reason is offered for not obtaining a search warrant
except the inconvenience to the officers and some slight de-
lay necessary to prepare papers and present the evidence
to a magistrate. These are never very convincing reasons
and, in these circumstances, certainly are not enough to by-
pass the constitutional requirement.
53
5. Lustig v. United States
One of the latest cases in the field of search and seizure is
Lustig v. United States,5 4 decided in late June, 1949. The case deals
not so much with the scope of a search and seizure, but rather in-
volves the rule that, unless federal officials have participated or
cooperated in an illegal search, the fruits of such illegal search are
admissible as evidence in a federal prosecution.5 5 The case is an
excellent illustration of what constitutes participation by a federal
officer in an illegal search, and serves further to illustrate the
Court's liberal application of the federal exclusionary rule of
evidence.
In the Lustig case, a federal secret service agent received in-
formation indicating a violation in a hotel room of a counterfeit-
ing statute, made a preliminary investigation, and conveyed to
local police his suspicion and the fact that he was "confident that
something was going on" in the room. Thereafter, the local police
secured warrants for the arrest of the defendants, occupants of
the room, charging the violation of a local ordinance requiring
"known criminals" to register with the local police within a cer-
-333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948).
5 334 U.S. at 706 (1948).
69 S. Ct. 1372 (1949).8 Cases cited notes 7. 8 & 9, supra.
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tain period after arrival in town. The local police, unaccompanied
by the federal agent, proceeded to the hotel, and upon finding the
defendants absent, entered and searched their room. Only after
this search revealed counterfeiting paraphernalia was the federal
agent summoned to the hotel. The federal agent examined the
evidence uncovered by the local police in their search of the room
and in a subsequent search of defendants who were arrested upon
returning to the room; however, he did not participate in the ac-
tual searches. The evidence so uncovered was eventually turned
over to federal authorities for use in prosecuting the defendants
on counterfeiting charges.
The defendants were convicted. The District Court admitted
the evidence after concluding that the illegal search had been con-
ducted entirely by state or local officers, independent of any partici-
pation, connivance or arrangement on the part of the federal agent
to have an illegal search made.
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, in a 5-4 decision.
Recognizing their earlier pronouncements of the rule that evidence
obtained as a result of an illegal search made by other than federal
officers is admissible in a federal prosecution, the Court held that
the federal agent had participated in this search and seizure. It
was pointed out that a search is a functional, not merely physical
process; that it is not completed until the illicitly obtained articles
have been effectively appropriated from the premises. The federal
agent,.having joined the searchers and examined the evidence, had
participated in its appropriation. To distinguish between parties
who participate from the beginning of a search and those who par-
ticipate by joining in the search before it has run its course, the
Court said, would be to draw too fine a line in the application of the
Fourth Amendment.
Holding as they did, that the federal agent had participated
in the search, the Court found it unnecessary to consider the result
had the search been conducted entirely by local officers and the evi-
dence turned over to federal authorities for use in a federal prosecu-
tion. The Court's earlier pronouncements on this question would
seem to have set the question at rest, as it has been frequently held
or stated that evidence received as a result of an illegal search con-
ducted solely by local officers is admissible in a federal prosecution.56
But in a concurring opinion by the late Mr. Justice Murphy, joined
by Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Rutledge, their position on
the reserved question seems clear. The important consideration to
them is the presence of an illegal search; whether local or federal
officers participated should be of no consequence.
CONCLUSIONS AND ACCEPTIBILITY OF RULE
The question of the admissibility of evidence in a state court
which has been illegally obtained by local officers is not properly
"Cases cited notes 7, 8 & 9, supra.
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within the scope of this article. Suffice to say that the state courts
are free to accept or reject the federal exclusionary rule. 57 This was
set at rest in Wolf v. People of Colorado,5 decided by the Court the
same day as the Lustig case. It was there held that the federal ex-
clusionary rule is not a command of the Fourth Amendment, but is
a judicially created rule of evidence, and does not impose its sanc-
tion upon the States through the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
Although the federal exclusionary rule is not a command of
the Fourth Amendment, is it not essential to the enforcement of the
commands of the Fourth Amendment? Is there any alternative
means of protecting the citizen from unreasonable searches and
seizures? It has been frequently stated that the victim of an un-
reasonable search may find his redress in a civil action for trespass
against the violator. Just as frequently, it has been asserted that
the violator is amenable to criminal prosecution. In form, these are
the alternatves. In substance, they are illusory.
The fallacies in these so-called alternatives are forcefully ex-
posed by the late Mr. Justice Murphy in his dissenting opinion in
Wolf v. People of Colorado.59 There, it is pointed out that the
nominal damages usually recoverable in an action for simple tres-
pass is no deterrent to an officer who envisions a salary increase for
"cracking the case." There, it is pointed out that the futility of
expecting a district attorney to prosecute himself or his associates
for violations of the Fourth Amendment during a raid which he,
himself, or his associates had ordered is only too well known.
It must, of course, be recognized that the exclusionary rule
sometimes delays the apprehension and prosecution of criminals.
Sometimes it prevents their conviction, although they are mani-
festly guilty of the crime charged. But it must also be remembered
that innocent citizens may be, and are, the victims of the trespass.
Apropos of this conclusion is the admonition expressed by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion in Davis v. United
States:60
It is not only under Nazi rule that police excesses are
inimical to freedom. It is easy to make light of insistence on
scrupulous regard for the safeguards of civil liberties when
invoked on behalf of the unworthy. It is too easy. History
bears testimony that by such disregard are the rights of
liberty extinguished, heedlessly at first, then stealthily, and
brazenly in the end.
0 At the present time, the federal exclusionary rule has been accepted in seventeen States,
rejected in thirty, and undecided in one. Accepted: Fla., Idaho, Ill., Ind., Iowa, Ky., Mie;., Miss.,
Mo., Mont., Okla., S. D.. Tenn.. Wash., W. Va., Wis., and Wyo. Rejected: Ala., Ariz., Ark.,
Cal.. Colo., Conn, Del., Ga., Kans., La., Me.. Md., Mass., Minn., Neb., Nev., N. H., N. J.,
N. M.. N. Y., N. C., N. D., Ohio, Ore., Pa., S. C., Tex., Utah, Vt., and Va. Undecided: R. I.
Wolf v. People People of Colorado, 69 S. Ct. at 1367, App., Table I, to Court's opinion.
" 69 S. Ct. 1859 (1949).
69 69 S. Ct. at 1369, 1370.
60 828 U.S. at 697.
